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Abstract 
Managerial power is the most critical element for the organizations because it plays a vital role in firm 
performance and pay setting process. Moreover, top management have all important information of the firms and 
if managerial power is high they may misuse such information. Considering the importance of managerial power 
numerous studies analyzed the different aspects of managerial power using data of different countries. This study 
proposed three hypotheses to assess the association among managerial power, executive remuneration, and firm 
performance. This study used PLS-SEM approach to test developed hypotheses using data of S&P/ASX 50 
index firms. All of the proposed hypotheses are accepted. This study also meet the quality criteria of both 
reflective and formative measurement scale as prerequisite to the assessment of structural model. 
Keywords: Managerial Power, Executive Remuneration, Firm Performance, Reflective and Formative 
Measurement, Australia 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Shareholders, stakeholders, institutional investors, and general public are more concerned about the 
remuneration of executives and directors. Executive remuneration must be properly designed because excessive 
remuneration can lead to excessive risk taking and persuade executive towards corporate voracity. Executive 
remuneration got more importance and public interest after global financial crises. These financial crises 
emphasized on developing a regulatory framework that will provide greater accountability and transparency of 
executive remuneration, and will better able to align the interest of executives with shareholders and firms 
performance. Executive remuneration is critical element of firm’s internal governance system. Because, by using 
appropriate remuneration the executives can be motivated to work harder and take actions that are in the interests 
of the shareholders (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Consequently, executive 
remuneration is a key to retain and attract talented executives (Conyon, 2006; Anderson and Bizjak 2003); 
proper remuneration reinforces the implementation of the company strategy and goals. Based on the reasoning 
above, it is easy to understand the significance of executive remuneration in the internal governance of the 
company. Consequently, executive remuneration is constituted of four key components: fixed remuneration, 
typically consisting of a salary, bonuses, generally include all the short term rewards; a variety of perquisites and 
supplementary benefits such as insurance, club memberships, and other noncash rewards; and long-term 
incentives, which may include various forms of stock options and deferred remuneration (Combs et al., 2007). 
In general, there are two views of executive remuneration in the literature. Under the optimal 
contracting view, CEO remuneration arrangements are the product of arm’s length contracting between the board 
of directors and executives, which results in remuneration contracts that provide efficient incentives to reduce 
agency problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In contrast, under rent-seeking view, CEOs influence the design 
and setting of remuneration contracts to personally benefit themselves, which results in greater agency problems 
between executives and shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). The central implication of the managerial 
power approach is simple. Rather than a solution to shareholders’ optimal contracting problem, executive 
remuneration is viewed as a mechanism through which powerful, entrenched CEOs extract rent from 
shareholders (Choe, Tian, and Yin, 2009). As a consequence, the more powerful CEOs are, the more pay they 
award themselves with less strings attached. In doing so, the only constraint CEOs face is what Bebchuk and 
Fried, (2003) called the ‘outrage constraint’, which curbs pay that is considered too excessive (Choe et al., 
2009). If one takes the implication of the managerial power theory literally, then the corollaries are that the total 
CEO pay should increase in managerial power, pay-performance sensitivity of CEO remuneration should 
decrease in managerial power and, consequently, managerial power should lead to worse firm performance. In 
the current study we investigate CEO power (managerial power) ability to influence the decision relating to 
remuneration. 
Overall, the empirical evidence on the executive remuneration is mixed. Some studies provide evidence 
supporting the optimal contracting view (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010; Edmans, Gabaix and Landier, 2008). Other 
studies provide evidence that CEOs exercise substantial influence over the executive remuneration process 
resulting in wealth transfer from shareholders to managers (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Core, Holthausen, and 
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Larker, 1999).  
Furthermore, many empirical studies of executive remuneration have been motivated by theories of 
firms. In the crudest form of the neoclassical economic theory, the primary objective of a firm is to pursue an 
economic goal of maximizing profits. This, in turn, will maximize gains for owners or shareholders of the firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, with separation of control and ownership, managers or executives are 
given power to manage the firm. And this makes it feasible for managers to pursue their self-interest rather than 
the owners’ or shareholders’ economic interest in maximizing profits. Since goals of shareholders (principal) and 
manager (agent) are not congruent, managers may engage themselves in optimistic behavior for maximizing 
their personal gains at the cost of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), this is the classical agency problem. 
Only above normal remuneration can dissuade managers from pursuing opportunism. This then gives rise to 
various forms of incentive remuneration (Ozkan, 2011). Without proper incentives, CEOs may not be inclined to 
act in the best interests of the shareholders. A CEO paid a flat salary, for example, may pursue goals other than 
maximizing firm value at potentially enormous cost to the shareholders (Wallsten, 2000). He further added that 
the top executive presumably has the most control over the firm’s decisions, and thus her pay should be most 
closely tied with performance. Additionally, CEO remuneration is more sensitive to performance than is the 
remuneration of other executives (Wallsten, 2000). 
The managerial power approach is in the spirit of the economics literature that focuses on the power 
certain agents obtain in organizations and those agents’ ability to use this power to extract rents (Bebchuk, Fried, 
and Walker, 2000). Unfortunately, financial economists working in the particular context of executive 
remuneration have largely followed the optimal contracting approach and paid little attention to the role of 
managerial power (Bebchuk et al., 2000). Current research provide a simple, theoretical analysis of how CEO 
power affects executive remuneration and firm performance. This research also investigate the relationship 
between executive remuneration and firm performance. There is a considerable body of research on executive 
remuneration. However, a large proportion of these studies examine listed firms in United States i.e. a study of 
Gregory‐Smith, (2012) and Li and Qian, (2011). Current study is different from other studies as it used 
Australian listed companies to investigate the developed hypotheses. As there is limited literature exist on 
executive remuneration using Australian data. Secondly, this study focus on managerial power to analyze its 
influence on remuneration by using a comprehensive set of dimensions that reflect the managerial power. Only 
limited literature provide evidence that managerial power strongly effect firm performance, current study also 
trying to fil this gap through investigating the relationship between managerial power and firm performance. 
Unlike to previous studies that focus on board structure (Rampling, 2012), its independence (Ryan and Wiggins, 
2004) and ownership concentration (Pinto and Leal, 2013).  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Under the managerial power approach part of the agency problem is that executives use their remuneration to 
provide themselves with rents (Bebchuk et al., 2002). Schneider, (2013) indicates that corporate managers have 
considerable power, even nominally independent directors are often connected to executives by bonds of interest, 
collegiality, or affinity. These directors might rise up and displace a particularly poorly performing CEO. 
However, if the CEO is performing adequately, they generally will be inclined to defer and support the CEO’s 
judgment (Bebchuk et al., 2002). They further argued that, these directors given the considerable influence of the 
CEO and the CEO’s management team over the board, bargaining over executive remuneration does not usually 
approach the arm’s length ideal. Rather, executives frequently use their power to increase their remuneration, 
and directors cooperate with management at least to some extent (Schneider, 2013).  The excess pay that 
executives are able to extract because of their positional power constitutes rents (Choe et al., 2009). Specifically, 
the amount of rents that an executive extracts is the excess of the pay obtained by him over what he would have 
received under a contract that maximizes shareholder value (Chalmers, Koh, and Stapledon, 2006). Because rent 
extraction is associated with managerial power, the managerial power approach suggests that there is a 
correlation between managerial power and rents (Chalmers et al., 2006; Bebchuk et al., 2002). The power of the 
CEO will depend in large part on the ownership structure of the firm (Pinto and Leal, 2013); the more shares 
owned by the CEO, the greater will be her influence on director elections and her ability to thwart or discourage 
a hostile takeover attempt. The more shares owned by unrelated parties, the less will be the CEO’s influence on 
director elections and the more vulnerable the CEO will be to a hostile takeover attempt (Weisbach, 2006). Thus, 
the power of the CEO will tend to increase with the percentage of shares he owns, and will tend to decrease with 
the percentage of shares owned by outside block holders (Agrawal and Nasser, 2012; Weisbach, 2006; Bebchuk 
and Fired, 2004). The CEO’s power will also depend on the number of inside directors and the number of 
independent directors because there is the number of independent directors over whom the CEO has some kind 
of influence (Li and Qian, 2011). For instance, an independent director might follow a CEO’s wishes because he 
is a longtime friend of the CEO or because he is grateful that the CEO has placed him on the board (Li and Qian, 
2011). The size of the board in terms of the number of directors is also likely to enable or constrain managerial 
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power (Ozkan, 2011; Adams et al., 2005). 
 As for board characteristics, majority of studies find that firm performance is positively related to 
smaller boards (Yermack, 1996; Conyon and Peck, 1998) and boards with less busy outside directors (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006; Core et al., 1999). Lipton and Lorsch, (1992) also argue that “the norm of behaviors in most 
boardrooms are dysfunctional” as directors often do not criticize the policies of executives, and this problem 
increases with size of the board. However, Coles et al. (2008) challenge the notion that restrictions on board size 
and management representation on the board necessarily enhance firm value. They find that complex firms have 
larger boards with more outside directors, compared to simpler firms, and that Tobin’s Q increases in board size 
for complex firms but decreases in board size for simple firms, and such relation is driven by the number of 
outside directors. In regards to the relation between firm performance and the duality of CEO as board chairman, 
Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, (1997) argue that the separation of CEO and board chairman has potential costs as 
well as potential benefits. Their evidence suggests that the costs are larger than the benefits for most large firms. 
However, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and Core et al. (1999) report a negative relation between such duality and 
firm performance while Adams et al. (2005) find no significant relation between the two.  
Likewise, Klein, (1998) finds no significant relation between the composition of board audit committee 
and firm performance, and between the composition of board remuneration committee and firm performance, 
although, Larcker et al. (2005) report that CEO’s closeness to members of the remuneration committee is shown 
to increase CEO remuneration, suggesting an indirect negative impact on firm performance. On the other hand, 
Callahan, Millar, and Schulman, (2003) find a positive relation between management participation in the director 
selection process and corporate performance. Another governance index, Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, (2007) 
measure CEO power as the percentage of aggregate top-five executives’ total remuneration captured by the 
CEO, which called CEO centrality. They show that CEO centrality is negatively related to firm performance.  
P. Kostiuk, (1990) and Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, (1999) published articles about firm size and 
executive remuneration. K.J. Murphy, (1999) observed that while companies use a variety of financial and non-
financial measures in their annual bonus plans for executives, most use a single measurement such as revenues, 
net income, pre-tax income, operating profits (EBIT), or economic value added. Similarly, in 1999, K. J. Murphy 
wrote a paper on “Executive Remuneration” which summarized empirical and theoretical research on executive 
remuneration and description of trends in pay practices for CEO pay. He observed that pay practices vary across 
firms, industries, and countries. There has been a dramatic shift in pay practices over time (more pay and more 
forms of remuneration). Consequently in 2004, K.J. Murphy and J. Zabojnik wrote an article and observed that 
some people believe that recent increases in pay reflect increased power that self-dealing CEOs wield over 
captive boards. This increased power, the argument goes, allows the CEOs to extract more “rents” from their 
companies, at the expense of the companies' workers and shareholders. K.J. Murphy and J. Zabojnik, (2004) 
argued that the “rent-extraction” explanation is not entirely convincing, and they offered a market-based 
explanation of the recent trends. Increases in executive remuneration can be explained by an increase in the 
importance of general skills, as opposed to firm-specific knowledge, to manage modern corporations.  
Nourayi, M. and S. Mintz (2008) in an article entitled, “Tenure, Firm’s Performance, and CEO’s 
Remuneration” looked at the influence of firm performance and CEO cash and total remuneration based on time 
in that position . Firm size appeared to be a significant explanatory variable for CEO cash and total remuneration 
regardless of CEO tenure and measure of performance. The data used was from 2001-2002. Prior research 
studies have found a small but significant link between total CEO remuneration and firm performance. Gregg et 
al. (2005) examine the relationship between executive cash remuneration and company performance for a sample 
of large UK companies over the period 1994-2002. Their findings show that overall there is little relationship 
between cash remuneration and performance. 
However, these studies used relatively old data or focused on traditional forms of pay without adequate 
consideration of stock awards and options. 
Hypothesis Development 
Managerial Power and Executive Remuneration 
A key structural governance feature is CEO duality, in which an individual has the roles of both CEO and board 
chairman. Managerial power theory predicts that the concentration of decision-making power in one individual 
leads to more power, for several possible reasons (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). First, since the CEO–
chairman is responsible for organizing board meetings and setting the agendas of these meetings, the CEO–
chairman is able to control the information provided to the board of directors (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992). Second, CEO duality increases the CEO’s influence over the nomination process of new 
directors (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). Third, the dual role of CEO and chairman can be considered as the highest 
rank in the corporate hierarchy. This figurehead status, with more mandate and power, can lead to more 
influence over the pay setting process (Ungson and Steers, 1984). The length of a CEO’s tenure is also likely to 
be an important determinant of managerial power. Longer tenured CEOs can be expected to have more influence 
over board members and their decisions because they have more status and more experience with the company 
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and its board (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2006).  CEOs with longer tenure can also be more influential over the 
remuneration committee directly. Evidence pointing in this direction shows that remuneration committees whose 
chairs have been installed later than the CEO tend to pay more (Main et al., 1995). Furthermore, other research 
has found that the relationship between firm performance and CEO pay weakens as tenure increases (Hill and 
Phan, 1991).  In addition, larger boards can become ineffective because of internal coordination and 
communication problems (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Therefore, the in-group monitoring and collective action 
problems of larger boards may provide executives with more power over the pay-setting process (O’Reilly and 
Main, 2010; Yermack, 1996). Finally, the composition of the board in terms of the percentage of independent 
directors may also influence managerial power (Ozkan, 2011).  
Hypothesis 1: Managerial power has positive and significant correlation with executive remuneration. 
Managerial Power and Firm Performance 
Scholars in strategic management have recently emphasized the role of top management teams in strategy 
formation and organizational performance. Empirical work on the association between top team demographics 
and firm performance is not abundant, even though there is evidence that they are related (Combs et al., 2007). 
For example, several researchers have examined the association between functional backgrounds and firm 
performance (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). This brief review indicates that important aspects of group 
composition have been somewhat underexplored; those aspects include both the extent to which a firm's chief 
executive officer (CEO) dominates the distribution of power within its top management team and the size of the 
team. CEO dominance and team size, both potentially important constructs because of their impact on the 
information processing capabilities of top management teams, were the focus of this study (Combs et al., 2007). 
A top management team can be considered the information processing center of an organization in its 
relationship with its environment. Understanding the determinants of firm performance is central to strategic 
management research (Rumelt et al., 1994), and the composition of the board of directors is one potential 
determinant that has received significant attention (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). According to agency theory, CEOs 
are self-interested, risk averse, and possess goals that diverge from those of shareholders. Thus, CEOs will 
engage in self-serving actions at shareholders’ expense when given an opportunity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Boards dominated by outside directors (directors that are affiliated with the firm only through their board 
membership) are thought to help protect shareholders from CEOs’ self-serving behavior by monitoring CEOs 
and offering them incentives to act in shareholders’ interests (Combs et al., 2007). Accordingly, firms with 
greater dominance by outside directors should experience greater firm performance. It is also possible for too 
much board control to result in negative consequences for shareholders (Combs et al., 2007). Outside directors 
often lack the in-depth knowledge of a firm’s operations that is needed to distinguish between performance 
outcomes that are in versus out of management’s control (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Consequently, 
outside director dominated boards tend to lean heavily on short-term accounting and stock market data to 
evaluate top management’s performance, which furnishes management with a strong incentive to smooth out 
earnings fluctuations and avoid investments with high risks and long-range paybacks (Combs et al., 2007). 
Hypothesis 2: Managerial power has negative and significant correlation with firm performance. 
Firm Performance and Executive Remuneration 
Consistent with the theoretical prediction, empirical studies documented strong evidence that firm performance 
are significantly associated with CEO cash remuneration (Sloan, 1993; Lambert and Larcker, 1987). Sloan, 
(1993) finds that CEO cash remuneration is more positively related to accounting earnings than stock returns 
when stock returns are noisy when measuring managers’ performance. As indicated above, this suggests that 
accounting earnings are more useful in remuneration contracts than stock returns to shield remuneration from 
market-wide fluctuations in equity values that are beyond managers’ control. Based on prior research (Murphy, 
1999), firm performance are more likely to be an explicit metric of performance in cash remuneration contracts. 
The agency-based theory generally supports that there is a positive relationship between executive remuneration 
and firm performance (Nourayi and Mintz, 2008), although some scholars argue that a positive relation is not 
well-established or is only weakly supported. For instance, using data from the Portuguese Stock Exchange, 
Fernandes, (2005) concludes that firm performance has little effect on CEO remuneration and he further claims 
that there is no relationship between stockholders’ wealth and executive remuneration. More recently, Jeppson et 
al. (2009) finds that CEO remuneration is positively related to a firm’s total revenue, but not related to the 
changes in total shareholders’ return or total net income. In sum, the pay-for-performance setting varies with 
different data, institutions, and model specifications. Comparatively, executive remuneration and CEO equity 
incentives have not been well studied in emerging economies (Kato and Long, 2006). Moreover, little is known 
about how Chinese CEOs are compensated compared to those in developed countries. Following traditional 
wisdom, this study hypothesizes that: 
Hypothesis 3: Firm performance has positive and significant correlation with executive remuneration. 
 
 
Journal of Poverty, Investment and Development                                                                                                                             www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2422-846X     An International Peer-reviewed Journal 
Vol.22, 2016 
 
52 
3. METHODOLOGY 
This study used S&P/ASX 50 index firms to test the hypotheses. Required data obtained from annual reports of 
Australian firms for the year of 2014. Annual reports were downloaded from company’s official websites. This 
study used four measures of executive remuneration: total remuneration, option and stock grants, salary, and 
bonus. Total remuneration includes salary, bonus, other annual remuneration, long-term incentive plan payouts, 
restricted stock grants, value of option grants, and all other remuneration, firm performance is measured through 
three items i.e. ROA, ROE, firm size (log of total assets), and CEO power measured using following items CEO 
age, tenure, shares of CEO, CEO appointed directors, board size and independence, all independent and 
dependent variables adopted from the study of Essen, Otten, and Carberry, (2012). 
This research used PLS-SEM technique to analyze the path models. PLS-SEM technique is more 
appropriate because it accurately deals with small sample size, with complex and large models (Hair et al., 
2014), moreover, this technique is most commonly applied in various research disciplines. According to the 
requirements of the PLS-SEM, the required sample size must be the ten times of the number of indicators of a 
formative construct in a model (Hair et al., 2014). In this study two constructs are measured as reflectively, 
namely, managerial power and firm performance, and managerial remuneration measured as formative construct 
with four indictors. Which show that the required sample size must be ten times greater than the four (4*10=40).  
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Reflective Measurement Scale 
Quality of reflective measurement constructs can be assessed through three quality criteria. Namely, Cronbach's 
alpha to measure internal consistency, value of AVE, and Convergent validity. The traditional criterion for 
internal consistency is Cronbach's alpha, which provides an estimate of the reliability based on the inter-
correlations of the observed indicator variables. Cronbach's alpha assumes that all indicators are equally reliable. 
Specifically, composite reliability values of 0.60 to 0. 70 are acceptable in exploratory research, while in more 
advanced stages of research, values between 0. 70 and 0.90 can be regarded as satisfactory (Hair et al., 2014). 
However, internal consistency measure is not applicable to formatively measured construct. To establish 
convergent validity, researchers consider the outer loadings of the indicators, as well as the average variance 
extracted (AVE).  AVE value of 0.50 or higher indicates that, on average, the construct explains more than half 
of the variance of its indicators. Conversely, an AVE of less than 0.50 indicates that, on average, more error 
remains in the items than the variance explained by the construct. 
Table 1: Reflective Measurement Constructs 
Reflective 
Constructs 
Items 
Items Outer 
Loadings 
t-statistics 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
AVE 
Managerial Power 
CEO age 0.875*** 42.573 
0.900 
 
 
 
0.680 
 
 
CEO tenure 0.889*** 23.433 
CEO shares 0.784*** 18.735 
CEO appointed 
directors 
0.869*** 14.165 
Board size 0.902*** 46.029 
Board independence 0.581*** 4.822 
Firm Performance 
ROA 0.744*** 10.034 
0.777 
 
0.621 
 
ROE 0.755*** 10.500 
Firm size 0.860*** 36.333 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Table 1 indicate the composite reliability or Cronbach alpha’s value of reflective constructs. Which 
meet the above mentioned criteria. It means that all items are equally reliable. Value of AVE also greater than 
the average which means that the both reflective constructs explain more than the half variance. Additionally, 
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outer loadings of all indicators are statistically significant. 
Discriminant Validity 
The discriminant validity of the measures was confirmed by employing the method of Fornell and Larcker 
(1981). As the diagonal elements were higher than the other elements of the row and column in which they were 
located, this confirms the discriminant validity of the outer model. 
Table 2: Discriminant Validity 
 Managerial Power Remuneration Firm Performance 
Managerial Power 0.824   
Remuneration 0.906 Formative Construct  
Frim Performance 0.785 0.833 0.788 
Formative Measurement Scale 
Reliability test for formative constructs is assessed through meeting the assumption of multicollinearity and 
validity is assessed through their significance. Multicollinearity is tested using Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
measure. Reliability and validity of formative construct is depict in Table 3. 
Table 3: Validity and Reliability of Formative Construct 
Formative Construct Items Items Outer Weights t-statistics VIF 
Remuneration 
Cash 0.866*** 5.630 1.861 
Equity 0.695*** 3.299 1.732 
STI 0.869*** 5.667 3.200 
Total remuneration 0.795*** 5.209 4.183 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Results of the Structural Model 
In this section results of the structural model of PLS-SEM is analyzed using the prescribed criteria by researchers. 
Variance Explained by the Model 
Explained variance is analyzed using the value of R2. In this research the explained variance (R2) is 0.860 which 
indicate that the variance explained by the model is 86%.  
Predictive Relevance 
This values was more than zero, indicating an adequate predictive validity of the model based on the criteria 
suggested by Hair et al. (2014). It is indicated by Q2 which indicate the prediction power of  
Q2= 0.317 
Q2 = 0.02 = Small  
Q2 = 0.15 = Medium, and 
Q2 = 0.35 = Large, indicate prediction power of the model. 
Here the value of Q2 is near to the large prediction power value which show the strong prediction quality of 
statistical model. 
Effect Size 
The effect size f2 allows evaluating measurable construct's contribution to an endogenous latent variable's R2 
value. It is the rule of thumb that f2 values range among, 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 indicate an exogenous construct's 
small, medium, or large effect, respectively, on an endogenous construct (Hair et al., 2014).  
Table 4: Effect Size 
Construct f 2 
Managerial Power 0.571 
Firm Performance 0.276 
Hypotheses Testing 
In this section the developed hypotheses are tested through the significance of the corresponding beta coefficient. 
Developed hypotheses is accepted or rejected on their level of significance of path coefficients. Level of 
significance is to be assessed through the bootstrapping technique as suggested by the Hair et al., (2014). 
Table 5: Path Coefficients and Hypotheses Test 
Hypotheses Path Coefficients t-Statistics Decision 
MPER 0.656 3.374*** Accepted 
MPFP -0.785 17.662*** Accepted 
FPER 0.318 1.682** Accepted 
MP= Managerial Power; ER= Executive Remuneration; FP= Firm Performance 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Results of the structural model for hypotheses test reflect some interesting facts. From Table 5 show 
that the managerial power has significant and positive correlation with executive remuneration, which means that 
as the managerial power increases the executive remuneration will also increase. As a result, hypothesis one is 
accepted at (β= 0.656, t= 3.374, p=0.001<0.01). Essan et al. (2012) also found the similar results. Similarly, the 
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results of regression analysis indicate that second hypothesis has been accepted at (β= -0.785, t= 17.662, 
p=0.000<0.01). Its means that managerial power has large, negative and significant impact on frim performance. 
Combs et al. (2007) reported the same results for managerial power and firm performance. Results of second 
hypothesis reflect that as the managerial power increases the firm performance decreases. Additionally, the 
regression results also provide support for hypothesis three, but the level of significance of the path coefficient of 
firm performance to executive remuneration is small than other two path coefficients. Hypothesis three is 
accepted at (β= 0.381, t= 1.682, p=0.000<0.05). Its means that the correlation between firm performance and 
executive remuneration is small.  
Discussion 
This study specifically designed to evaluate the impact of managerial power on executive remuneration and firm 
performance. Because managerial power is the most crucial problem of businesses.  As top management refers to 
the upper intellectual body of the organization, thy hold and process all type of information. In literature some 
authors also said that top management is the central information processing, managing, and controlling part of 
firms. They may manipulate these information just for their own sake if they have more power and control over 
the firm and this phenomenon provide roots to many other problems like, executive remuneration and firm 
performance.  This study developed three hypotheses to test the impact of managerial power on executive 
remuneration and firm performance and find that when managerial power is high they are in position to influence 
their pay setting process and able to shield their pay current loses. Thus their pay increases without any proper 
justification; because they have full control over corporate board, independent directors may also appointed by 
CEO or executives and many other factors cause increase in managerial power. Similarly, managerial power also 
negatively influence the firm performance, according to the managerial power theory when managerial power 
increases they are more concern with their own interest rather to focus on other parties i.e. shareholders, block 
holders and owners interest.  Results of current study indicate that the impact of managerial power on firm 
performance greater than all other correlations. 
Firms must take necessary steps to eliminate the managerial power to avoid poor firm performance and 
excessive remuneration. This will only possible when board is free of CEO’s control. Independent directors must 
work independently without showing Sympathy with any top management team member. Lot of studies 
investigated the impact of CEO power on remuneration and firm performance on cash remuneration and equity 
remuneration. However, this study update the extant literature with some value able information found in 
throughout the study and fill the existing gap that managerial power not only influence executive remuneration 
but has large negative effect on frim performance. 
Despite the significance, this study also subject to some limitations. The data is based on Australian 
firms and the results of this study will not be generalizable and the selected sample is also small. Additionally, 
there may be some other variables that will cause the managerial power, however this study include only those 
variables of managerial power that was provided in literature.  
An interesting expansion of the current research is that future researches can use data of others 
countries test this relationships and they may also large data set. Future research can also be done by adding 
some new and positional elements of managerial power. Researchers may also investigate some other important 
determinants of executive remunerations like, remuneration committee. Remuneration committee is responsible 
for setting executive remuneration and managerial power also influence the governance quality of remuneration 
committee (Rampling, 2012). 
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